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 Early in Franz Kafka’s novella The Metamorphosis, Gregor Samsa, whose overnight 
transformation into a giant insect has made him late for work, receives a visit from his 
office’s chief clerk.1 As Samsa hides in his room and attempts to explain himself, the 
chief clerk, who professes to speak in the name of the office’s chief, berates him for his 
sub-par work performance and warns that Samsa’s “position in the firm is not so 
unassailable.”2 Kafka’s work often explored the notion that the workings of powerful 
institutions are inaccessible, even inscrutable, to the individual.3 Almost a century 
later, his satiric jabs at bureaucracy and the power imbalance between employer and 
employee continue to resonate in numerous employment discrimination actions filed 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).4
 One complicated sphere of employment discrimination law is the doctrine of 
constructive discharge.5 An employee is constructively discharged when intolerable 
working conditions force her to resign.6 Constructive-discharge claims occupy an 
important position among other Title VII discrimination claims. Although the 
doctrine is especially helpful to employees who experience sexual harassment in the 
workplace,7 constructive-discharge cases arise in a variety of contexts.8 Since anti-
discrimination laws do not expressly prevent employers from creating a work 
environment in which an employee would have no other choice but to quit, courts 
have developed the doctrine of constructive discharge to serve as a means of relief for 
employees who feel that they have been forced to leave their jobs.9 Under Title VII, 
employees are required to avail themselves of all administrative remedies before filing 
their claims in federal court.10 The administrative exhaustion requirement, which 
1. Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis, in The Complete Stories 89, 89, 94–98 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 
1971).
2. Id. at 97.
3. See generally Franz Kafka, The Trial (David Wyllie trans., Dover Publications 2012) (1925).
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–718, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2015)). Under Title VII, an employer may not discriminate 
against an employee based upon that employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. § 
2000e-2(a)(1).
5. See Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that the unique nature of 
constructive-discharge claims raises issues as to when such claims should accrue).
6. Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 307, 
309–10 (2004).
7. See id. at 310–11 (“Employment discrimination lawyers know that employees are reluctant to sue their 
current employer and will often file a claim only after they have left their job. Constructive discharge 
claims are thus one important vehicle by which sexual harassment is challenged by employees and 
scrutinized in the courts.”).
8. See, e.g., Green, 760 F.3d at 1137 (examining discriminatory conduct based on race); Flaherty v. Metromail 
Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (examining discriminatory conduct based partly on age).
9. Cathy Shuck, That’s It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 401, 402–03 (2002).
10. Benjamin J. Morris, A Door Left Open? National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan and Its Effect 
on Post-Filing Discrete Acts in Employment Discrimination Suits, 43 Cal. W. L. Rev. 497, 502 (2007).
253
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
provides that the employee must notify the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) of the claim by the applicable deadline, is intended to promote 
out-of-court settlements of employee grievances.11 Since constructive discharge is 
unique among other Title VII actions, courts have adopted disparate positions as to 
when a constructive-discharge claim should accrue.12 The Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
a recent constructive-discharge case, Green v. Donahoe,13 threatens to exacerbate some 
of the difficulties faced by employees in preserving their claims and leave them even 
more vulnerable to employer misconduct.
 In Green, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
postmaster Marvin Green’s constructive-discharge claim against his employer, the 
United States Postal Service, was time-barred because the forty-five-day statute of 
limitations had expired.14 Green argued that the limitations period did not begin 
until he provided notice of resignation.15 The court, however, found that the 
limitations period began on the date of his employer’s last alleged discriminatory 
act16 and not the date when Green announced that he would resign from his 
position.17 This case comment contends that the Tenth Circuit erred in holding that 
constructive-discharge claims accrue at the last identifiable act of employer 
misconduct instead of the date that the employee provides resignation notice. The 
Tenth Circuit failed to consider instructive precedent on continuous discriminatory 
acts. In addition, the court’s logic in reaching its holding was similar to the Supreme 
Court’s logic in the overruled case Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.18 The 
holding was also based on the f lawed reasoning that setting the date of accrual at the 
time that the employee decides to resign grants the employee full control over the 
start of the limitations period.19 Finally, the decision creates a public policy issue by 
pressuring employees to file discrimination claims immediately after they receive 
discriminatory treatment from their employers or else lose the opportunity to pursue 
a remedy later.
 Plaintiff Marvin Green, an African American postmaster, had worked for the 
Postal Service since 1973.20 In 2008, Green’s supervisor, Gregory Christ, promoted a 
11. Id.
12. See Green, 760 F.3d at 1144.
13. 760 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2014).
14. Id. at 1142.
15. Id.
16. This piece uses the term “discriminatory act” to refer to any act by the employer that demonstrates 
discriminatory intent. The term encompasses both discrete and continuous discriminatory acts.
17. Green, 760 F.3d at 1145 (“Green does not claim that the Postal Service did anything more to him after 
December 16, 2009, the day he signed the settlement agreement. He first initiated EEO counseling on 
his constructive-discharge claim on March 22, 2010, well beyond 45 days later. That was too late.”).
18. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
19. Green, 760 F.3d at 1144–45.
20. Id. at 1137.
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Hispanic employee to a postmaster position in Boulder, Colorado instead of Green.21 
In response, Green filed a discrimination charge with the Postal Service’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) office claiming that Christ passed over him for 
the position because of his race.22 After the EEO investigation concluded, Green 
requested a hearing with the EEOC, which settled the matter.23 Green filed two 
more charges a year later, claiming that Christ and his replacement, Jarman Smith, 
had harassed and threatened him because of his race and the discrimination charge 
he filed.24
 In November 2009, four months after he filed his third charge, Green was 
summoned to an investigative interview for allegedly delaying the mail and neglecting 
his duty to handle employee grievances.25 An interview with the Postal Service 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concerning allegations that Green had 
delayed the mail immediately followed.26 After the OIG meeting, Charmaine 
Ehrenshaft, the Postal Service’s Manager of Labor Relations, and David Knight, the 
Manager of Human Resources, informed Green that he would be placed on unpaid 
“off-duty status” for interfering with the Postal Service’s daily functions.27 Although 
the OIG concluded after the interview that Green had not purposefully delayed the 
mail, Knight contacted Green’s lawyer and claimed that the OIG was continuing its 
investigation and that criminal charges for delay of the mail “could be a life changer.”28
 Green signed a settlement agreement with the Postal Service on December 16, 
2009.29 Under the agreement, Green would relinquish his postmaster job and receive 
his accrued annual and sick leave as pay until March 31, 2010, at which time he 
could choose to either retire or assume a lower-paying postmaster position in 
Wamsutter, Wyoming, 300 miles away from his place of employment in Colorado.30 
In turn, the Postal Service agreed not to pursue any charges based on the investigations 
conducted by its Human Resources staff and by the OIG.31
 After filing a charge alleging that he had faced employer retaliation in the form of 
investigatory interviews, Green announced his resignation on February 9, 2010.32 On 
March 22, 2010, Green contacted an employment counselor, claiming that he had 
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1138.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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been constructively discharged from his job.33 Green brought a lawsuit against his 
employer in September 2010.34 Among the retaliatory employment acts alleged in the 
complaint was his constructive discharge.35 Federal regulations required Green, a 
federal employee, to “initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of 
the matter alleged to be discriminatory.”36 The district court held that Green’s 
constructive-discharge claim was time-barred because he had not initiated counseling 
within forty-five days of December 16, 2009, the date on which he signed the 
settlement agreement with the Postal Service.37 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on Green’s 
constructive-discharge claim.38
 Green argued that the limitations period on his constructive-discharge claim did 
not begin to run until he provided notice of his resignation.39 The Tenth Circuit, 
however, held that the limitations period on a constructive-discharge claim begins at 
the time of the last alleged discriminatory act of the employer.40 The court concluded 
that an employee’s notice of resignation was not a discriminatory act that could 
trigger the limitations period.41 In reaching its decision that the limitations period 
began, at the latest, when Green signed the settlement agreement, the court first 
considered the reasons for recognizing constructive discharge as an actionable 
claim.42 According to the court’s reasoning, constructive-discharge claims serve as a 
means of recourse for employees who are forced to resign by their employers’ efforts 
to create an intolerable work atmosphere.43
 The Tenth Circuit looked to several authorities to determine when a constructive-
discharge claim should accrue. According to another Tenth Circuit case, most federal 
limitations periods begin when a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of 
her injury.44 In employment discrimination cases, the Tenth Circuit has held that the 
start of the limitations period usually coincides with the moment the plaintiff is 
informed of the disputed employer action.45
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1138–39.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (2015).
37. Green, 760 F.3d at 1139.
38. Id. at 1137.
39. Id. at 1142.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1142–44.
42. Id. at 1142.
43. Id. at 1142–43.
44. Id. at 1143 (citing Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011)).
45. Id. (citing Almond, 665 F.3d at 1177). 
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 The court in Green, however, observed that Supreme Court precedent has 
distinguished constructive discharge from formal, employer-initiated discharge in 
that constructive discharge consists of both the employee’s resignation and the 
employer’s discriminatory conduct.46 Later Supreme Court decisions would reinforce 
the notion that a constructive discharge has not taken place until the employee 
actually resigns because resignation is a required element of the claim.47 As the Tenth 
Circuit noted, the Supreme Court has held that a limitations period begins to toll 
when the plaintiff ’s cause of action is complete.48 The Tenth Circuit held that for 
practical reasons, these Supreme Court holdings should not be read to set the date of 
accrual at the date the employee announces resignation.49
 In deciding when a constructive-discharge claim begins to accrue, the Tenth 
Circuit adopted a position that contradicted the Second, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits, 
all of which measure the start of the limitations period on constructive discharges 
from the date that the employee decides to quit.50 The court in Green distinguished 
the other circuits’ decisions on the ground that in each of those cases, the employer’s 
last discriminatory act took place within the time frame imposed by the applicable 
statute of limitations.51 In addition, the Tenth Circuit argued that the language of 29 
C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) would not permit the conclusion that the employee’s 
resignation or notice of resignation was a “discriminatory act” of the employer.52 The 
opinion cited Delaware State College v. Ricks53 to support its position that the employee’s 
notice of resignation does not amount to a discriminatory act by the employer.54
 The Tenth Circuit also did not recognize any practical reasons to start the 
limitations period after the employee’s notice of resignation. The court stated that 
taking such a stance would effectively allow the employee to decide when the period 
should begin by delaying the date of resignation.55 The court noted that limitations 
periods already afford employees time to decide whether their jobs have become 
intolerable and whether the appropriate course is to resign.56 The court also noted that 
46. Id. (citing Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004)).
47. Id. (“To recover for constructive discharge, . . . an employee generally is required to quit his or her job.” 
(quoting Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 559 U.S. 175, 184 (2010))).
48. Id. at 1143–44 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
49. See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
50. Green, 760 F.3d at 1144 (citing Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); Draper 
v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998); Young v. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Servs. 
Research, 828 F.2d 235, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1987)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
54. Green, 760 F.3d at 1144 (“[T]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the 
time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” (quoting Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258)).
55. Id. at 1144–45.
56. Id. at 1145.
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the plaintiff in Green had the option of filing a discrimination claim based on his 
employer’s precipitating conduct instead of a constructive discharge, and could later 
amend the complaint to include the constructive-discharge claim.57 Green did not 
allege that any discriminatory acts had taken place after December 16, 2009, and he 
did not contact an employment counselor as to the constructive discharge within 
forty-five days of that date.58 For the above reasons, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff ’s constructive-discharge claim was time-barred.59
 The Tenth Circuit erred in holding that the limitations period on a constructive-
discharge claim does not begin when the employee decides to quit because the court 
(1) overlooked instructive precedent on continuous discriminatory acts, (2) utilized 
faulty logic similar to that in the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision, (3) falsely 
assumed that the employee is in complete control of the date of resignation, and (4) 
set a standard that will confuse both employees and employers as to the appropriate 
filing deadline for constructive-discharge claims.
 While instructive Supreme Court precedent on continuous discriminatory acts 
exists, the Tenth Circuit in Green was narrowly focused on discrete discriminatory 
acts.60 In reaching its conclusion that the limitations period should begin after the 
last discriminatory act of the employer, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ricks.61 The plaintiff in Ricks, a Liberian college professor, filed a 
lawsuit alleging that he had been denied tenure because of his nationality.62 His 
employer offered him a contract to teach for another year, and he filed a discrimination 
charge with the EEOC about nine months after signing the terminal contract.63 
Ricks, however, is not applicable precedent in a constructive-discharge case. The 
discriminatory act at issue in Ricks was not a constructive discharge. Whereas Green 
alleged that he was constructively discharged for discriminatory reasons, the plaintiff 
in Ricks only alleged that he was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons.64 Ricks’s 
discharge was an inevitable result of the employer’s discriminatory act, the denial of 
tenure, but not the discriminatory act itself.65 The Supreme Court held that Ricks’s 
receiving notice of the denial of tenure, not Ricks’s consequent departure, tolled the 
57. Id. 
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. (holding that Green’s constructive-discharge claim was time-barred because it was filed more 
than forty-five days after Green signed the settlement agreement). Continuous discriminatory acts take 
place over a span of time, whereas discrete discriminatory acts occur in isolated instances. See discussion 
infra pp. 258–59.
61. Green, 760 F.3d at 1144.
62. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252–54 (1980).
63. Id. at 253–54.
64. Id. at 254–55; see also Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (pointing out 
the difference between the discriminatory act alleged in Ricks and a constructive discharge).
65. Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110; see also Kara M. Farina, When Does Discrimination “Occur?”: The Supreme 
Court’s Limitation on an Employee’s Ability to Challenge Discriminatory Pay Under Title VII, 38 Golden 
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statute of limitations.66 Some courts, however, have reasoned that a constructive 
discharge, although initiated by the employee, should begin to accrue at the same 
time as other discriminatory discharges.
 The Fourth Circuit, in Young v. National Center for Health Services Research, held 
that although an employee’s resignation is not normally a “discriminatory act” for 
purposes of Ricks, the resignation is a discriminatory act in the context of a constructive 
discharge.67 The Young opinion supports the conclusion that constructive-discharge 
claims should not begin to accrue at the same time as other employment discrimination 
actions. Under a standard that does not include resignation as part of the discriminatory 
act, employees looking to preserve constructive-discharge claims will feel pressured to 
notify their employment counselors each time they face adverse treatment in the 
workplace and possibly before a constructive-discharge claim has ripened. Past Supreme 
Court cases have considered the cumulative impact of discriminatory acts. Since 
constructive discharges include the employee’s involuntary resignation and all of the 
contributory employer misconduct,68 they are closer to hostile work environments, in 
which the employer’s misconduct occurs over a span of time and not only in one instance.
 The Supreme Court’s treatment of continuous discriminatory acts such as a hostile 
work environment in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan69 could have served 
as a useful guide for the Tenth Circuit. A constructive discharge is often analogous to 
a hostile work environment,70 a discriminatory act consisting of component parts.71 In 
dealing with cases involving ongoing acts of employer misconduct, the Supreme Court 
has set a useful precedent that the Tenth Circuit overlooked. The plaintiff in Morgan, 
who had allegedly been subjected to harassment and uncommonly harsh discipline due 
to his race, sued his employer for creating a hostile work environment.72 As evidence of 
the negative environment, the plaintiff alleged numerous incidents of his supervisors 
Gate U. L. Rev. 249, 257–58 (2008) (characterizing the holding of Ricks as barring claims where the 
relevant employment action, such as termination, is not discriminatory on its face).
66. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261–62.
67. 828 F.2d 235, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Whether an employer’s action is a ‘discriminatory act’ or merely 
an ‘inevitable consequence’ of prior discrimination depends on the particular facts of the case. . . . A 
resignation is not itself a ‘discriminatory act’ if it is merely the consequence of past discrimination, but 
if the employer discriminates against an employee and purposely makes the employee’s job conditions so 
intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign, then the resignation is a constructive 
discharge—a distinct discriminatory ‘act’ for which there is a distinct cause of action.”).
68. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
69. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
70. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 133–34 (“To establish hostile work environment, plaintiffs . . . must show 
harassing behavior ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their] employment.’ . . . 
Beyond that, we hold, to establish ‘constructive discharge,’ the plaintiff must make a further showing: 
She must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation 
qualified as a fitting response.” (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986))).
71. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
72. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104–05.
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using racial slurs.73 Although some of the acts that contributed to the hostile work 
environment fell outside the applicable limitations period of 300 days, the Supreme 
Court held that those acts could still be considered as part of the same claim.74
 Although Morgan, like Ricks, did not deal with a constructive-discharge claim, it 
offers guidance for courts examining continuous discrimination claims. Most 
illuminating is Morgan’s distinction between discrete employment acts such as 
termination or failure to promote and those that involve “repeated conduct,” such as 
hostile work environments.75 Green’s constructive-discharge claim fell in the latter 
category because it consisted of component parts that amounted to one discriminatory 
act. The repeated conduct that occurs in hostile work environment claims often spans 
days or even years and can culminate in the employee’s resignation.76 Before resigning, 
Green was harassed with threats of criminal prosecution and received a settlement 
offer that forced him to quit or accept a lower-paying position 300 miles away.77 
Constructive-discharge cases generally follow this pattern of repeated conduct. For 
example, in Fierro v. New York City Department of Education, the plaintiff, a substitute 
teacher, alleged that her employer, a principal, had written poor performance 
evaluations of her work, held unnecessary meetings to discuss her performance, falsely 
accused her of using corporal punishment, and ordered her to receive a psychiatric 
evaluation.78 The court in that case held that the constructive-discharge claim was 
timely because it accrued on the day the plaintiff announced her resignation.79
 Although it did not resolve the issue of whether an employee’s resignation is a 
“discriminatory act,” the Supreme Court’s holding in Morgan stands for the notion 
that each component in an ongoing discriminatory act builds upon those that 
preceded it and places it in a context in which it would not belong independently.80 
73. Id. at 120.
74. Id. at 120–21. The relevant statute required that the plaintiff “file a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred.’” Id. at 104–05 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2015)).
75. Id. at 114–15 (“Discrete acts . . . are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory 
adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ . . . 
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated 
conduct.”); cf. Chamallas, supra note 6, at 315 (noting that constructive-discharge cases are often 
factually similar to hostile environment claims and distinguishing them in the sense that in a 
constructive discharge, the employee quits in response to the hostile environment and “what would 
otherwise be regarded as a voluntary resignation should be treated as an involuntary termination.”). 
76. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
77. Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2014).
78. 994 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
79. Id. at 586 (holding that the constructive-discharge claim accrued when plaintiff announced her 
resignation because Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), was the controlling 
standard in the jurisdiction).
80. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (“The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore cannot be said to occur on any 
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a 
single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.”); see also Kyle Graham, The Continuing 
Violations Doctrine, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 271, 303 (2007–2008) (arguing that plaintiffs face difficulty in 
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The resignation in a constructive discharge is different from resignations under other 
circumstances because it is a reaction to a pattern of mistreatment by the employer.81 
In failing to consider whether Green’s notice of resignation was a component part in 
one recurring discriminatory act, the Tenth Circuit neglected the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of an analogous issue. If the court had looked to Morgan instead of Ricks 
for guidance, it would have recognized that, just as one act of harassment is one 
component of a hostile work environment, an employee’s resignation is a necessary 
element that helps to form a constructive discharge. From a public policy standpoint, 
setting the accrual date at the time that the employee decides that the job has become 
unbearable would ensure that the employee appreciates the scope of the employer’s 
discriminatory conduct and the appropriate claim to file in response.
 One recent Supreme Court decision employed a logic similar to that in Green. In 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Court held that an employment 
discrimination claim could not accrue upon the issuance of a paycheck that was 
reduced as the result of past discrimination.82 Under Goodyear’s policy, employees 
were awarded or denied raises based on performance evaluations.83 Employees were 
not aware of these pay decisions because Goodyear did not disclose its employees’ 
salaries.84 Ledbetter claimed that she had received negative performance evaluations 
because of her sex and that she did not receive a fair pay raise because of those 
evaluations.85 The majority held that Ledbetter’s claim accrued on the date that she 
received notice of the last discriminatory pay decision that reduced her salary, not the 
later date on which she received a paycheck that was reduced as a result of that 
decision.86 In her highly-influential dissent in the case, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
criticized the majority’s failure to consider the cumulative effect of the defendant 
employer’s discriminatory pay decisions and its narrow focus on the individual pay 
decisions that affected the defendant’s paychecks.87 By marking the start of the 
limitations period at the time that the employers made their discriminatory decisions, 
the Supreme Court was allowing the employers to lawfully “[carry] past pay 
determining when their claims have accrued because of the ongoing, cumulative nature of hostile work 
environments).
81. See Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete…”: The Enforceability of 
Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 1, 34–35 (2002) (“In 
[constructive-discharge] cases, the employee charges that her former employer behaved in a manner that 
made the work environment so intolerable or unbearable that she had no choice but to quit - that in 
effect, she was discharged. Quite simply, if an employee proves that she was constructively terminated, 
the separation is a ‘hybrid’ termination-resignation and most likely a termination without cause.”).
82. 550 U.S. 618, 637 (2007).
83. Id. at 621.
84. Id. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 622.
86. Id. at 627–28.
87. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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discrimination forward.”88 The Court’s holding in Ledbetter was quickly overruled by 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.89 The Tenth Circuit in Green quickly 
dismissed the proposition that an employee’s resignation could be categorized as a 
discriminatory act.90 Similar to the Supreme Court in Ledbetter, its focus was 
improperly narrow because it failed to consider the possibility that later events may 
represent the recurrence of a past discriminatory act.
 Both Ledbetter and Green, in their focus on those acts in which employers are 
directly involved and not the later consequences of the acts, failed to appreciate the 
burden on employees in preserving their discrimination claims and contributed to a 
policy problem that will pressure employees to report claims prematurely. The 
difficulty that an employee faces in choosing an appropriate moment to contact an 
employment counselor is compounded by the fact that the overall effect or intent of 
an employer’s actions is rarely immediately evident.91 Victims of pay discrimination, 
as Justice Ginsburg noted in her Ledbetter dissent, are not always privy to their 
supervisors’ individual decisions to reduce their paychecks.92 Goodyear, the defendant 
employer in the case, did not disclose employee salaries.93 Although the OIG 
concluded that Green did not intentionally delay the mail, Green’s attorney was led 
to believe that the investigation was ongoing and that Green might be subject to 
criminal charges.94 The discriminatory conduct in Green echoed that in Ledbetter in 
the sense that crucial information weighing on Green’s employment status was 
withheld from Green. Constructive-discharge claims, which typically consist of a 
series of discriminatory acts, are difficult to identify for purposes of contacting an 
88. Id.
89. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to 
discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision 
or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory 
compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.”).
90. Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 2014).
91. See Evan D. H. White, Note, A Hostile Environment: How the “Severe or Pervasive” Requirement and the 
Employer’s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs in a Catch-22, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 853, 878 
(2006) (discussing hostile work environment claims in a sexual harassment context and pointing out 
that “[a]lthough courts have the luxury of viewing the whole record of harassment, victims cannot 
predict what the cumulative effect of the harassment will be after only experiencing the first of what 
could develop into a series of incidents.”).
92. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When an employer makes a decision of such open 
and definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an explanation and evaluate it for 
pretext. Compensation disparities, in contrast, are often hidden from sight.”); see also Amalia Goldvaser, 
Inflating Goodyear’s Bottom Line: Paying Women Less and Getting Away with It, 15 Cardozo J.L. & 
Gender 99, 112 (2008) (discussing Ledbetter and noting that pay discrimination is “close to impossible” 
to report to an EEO counselor because it is concealed from employees).
93. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Green, 760 F.3d at 1138.
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employment counselor, especially when potentially-discriminatory acts transpire 
without the employee’s knowledge. In addition, the discriminatory acts that lead to a 
constructive discharge often take the form of performance evaluations, disciplinary 
sanctions, and other measures that are not overtly discriminatory.95 The Tenth 
Circuit’s precedent in Green will only serve to penalize employees who honestly fail 
to perceive that they have been forced into retirement until the limitations period has 
already elapsed.
 The Tenth Circuit also exhibited f lawed reasoning when it argued that measuring 
the start of the limitations period from the date of the employee’s notice of resignation 
would afford the employee full control of the claim’s accrual.96 An employee’s 
resignation due to constructive discharge is the equivalent of an involuntary 
discharge.97 The court’s argument dismisses the possibility that factors outside the 
employee’s control may weigh on the ultimate decision to resign. Green’s settlement 
agreement, for example, required Green to decide whether to retire or to accept a 
highly-inconvenient alternate job by a specific date, March 31, 2010.98 The Green 
opinion implies that the decision to resign is reached entirely at the employee’s 
convenience.99 Other constructive-discharge cases demonstrate that a plaintiff does 
not consciously decide the most opportune time to resign but rather reacts to the 
employer’s repeated acts of misconduct by resigning. In Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 
Inc., for example, the plaintiff resigned after her claims of repeated acts of sexual 
harassment were received with derisive laughter from her supervisor.100 The plaintiff 
in Flaherty v. Metromail Corp. was subjected to sexist remarks by her supervisor, who 
commented that women should be “barefoot and pregnant,” not employed.101 A 
subsequent supervisor agreed to meet with his male employees’ customers but not 
with Flaherty’s, thereby placing Flaherty’s ability to generate business at a 
disadvantage.102 Flaherty later discovered that the same supervisor referred to her as 
an “old bag” and planned to transfer her accounts to a younger, male account 
95. See id. at 1137 (stating that Green was called to an investigative interview for delaying the mail); Fierro 
v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 994 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that employer held 
unnecessary disciplinary meetings regarding plaintiff ’s work); Gerhart v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 
No. 00-CV-5914, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11935, at *2–4 (E.D. Pa. March 4, 2002) (stating that 
plaintiff schoolteacher rejected her principal’s sexual advances and was assigned an inconvenient work 
schedule, purportedly because of “low enrollment,” and that the same principal later gave the plaintiff a 
zero for “Personality” on an evaluation).
96. Green, 760 F.3d at 1144–45.
97. Barbara T. Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Workplace Harassment Law 20-2 (2012) (noting 
that a resignation in response to intolerable working conditions is a constructive discharge and that 
“[t]he employee can thus treat the resignation as a formal discharge.”).
98. Green, 760 F.3d at 1138.
99. See id. at 1144–45.
100. 147 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998).
101. 235 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. Id.
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executive.103 After suffering physical and emotional stress-related symptoms, Flaherty 
provided notice of her intent to retire.104 The workplace only becomes intolerable so 
as to prompt the employee’s resignation as a result of the employer’s discriminatory 
actions, not the employee’s caprices.105
 An employee is often not in control of her date of resignation. In fact, particular 
instances of constructive discharge have resulted in the employee’s physical sickness. 
In Young, for example, the plaintiff ’s employer abused the plaintiff during work, 
denied her annual and sick leave, and blocked her access to training facilities.106 
Young’s complaint to her EEO counselor alleged that the pattern of abusive treatment 
caused her to feel sick and finally to resign.107 If, under similar abusive conditions, a 
person chooses to resign, the decision is often made under significant emotional 
strain, not at the employee’s leisure. Plus, in anticipating issues that may arise during 
litigation of the claim, an employee is sometimes forced to perform a difficult 
balancing act when judging the proper time to resign.108
 The precedent set by Green v. Donahoe could also contribute to a significant 
public policy issue. Due to the nebulous nature of constructive-discharge claims, 
employees will want to file discrimination claims early in order to ensure that their 
grievances fall within the limitations period. A strict standard such as that set by 
Green would pressure employees to file discrimination claims after virtually every act 
of discriminatory conduct by their employers. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter 
seemingly anticipated this potential problem when it pointed out that under the 
majority’s holding, each discriminatory pay reduction that the plaintiff “did not 
immediately challenge wiped the slate clean.”109 When an employee such as Green is 
expected to notify a counselor after a discrete discriminatory act but before that 
employee has realized the cumulative impact of the employer’s actions, that employee 
will naturally want to file a complaint for every negative interaction with the 
employer, however minor.110 Most problematic is the possibility that merited 
103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. 
105. See id. at 138 (arguing that only the employee can judge when an employer’s discriminatory conduct has 
made the work environment intolerable).
106. 828 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1987).
107. Id.; see also Shuck, supra note 9, at 408 (citing NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe, 201 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 
1953) and noting that the female employee’s discriminatory treatment at the hands of her employer was 
accompanied by health problems).
108. See Raymond F. Gregory, Unlawful and Unwelcome: Sexual Harassment in the American 
Workplace 163 (2004) (observing that if an employee resigns too late, a court may find that her 
resignation was not a result of employer harassment and that if she resigns too early, “the court may 
conclude that the employer, given sufficient time, would have resolved those problems.”).
109. 550 U.S. 618, 660 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110. The problem is further complicated if a plaintiff lacks knowledge as to what constitutes a legally-
actionable claim. See White, supra note 91, at 878 (“[M]any sexual harassment victims do not possess 
the legal expertise to know what types of harassment are serious enough to warrant or require a formal 
complaint.”).
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constructive-discharge claims will be lost if the employee does not act within the 
narrow window imposed by the Tenth Circuit’s decision. Beginning the limitations 
period for constructive-discharge claims with the employee’s resignation would solve 
this problem by establishing a specific event that triggers the administrative deadline.
 When employees fall victim to mistreatment by their employers, they depend 
upon institutional remedies for relief. Constructive discharge is one field where 
courts have the opportunity to refine the law so as to best suit employment-
discrimination plaintiffs’ needs. Measuring the start of the limitations period in 
constructive-discharge cases from the time the employee decides to leave would 
guarantee that the employee has considered the full nature and effect of the employer’s 
discriminatory behavior and filed an appropriate claim. The Tenth Circuit’s holding 
in Green was inconsistent with case law dealing with continuing violations. The 
court’s reasoning recalled Ledbetter in its preoccupation with employer acts instead of 
the reverberations of those acts. The opinion’s assertion that setting the accrual date 
at the time the employee quits would place the statute of limitations within the 
employee’s sole control ignored the realities of constructive discharges. Forcing 
employees to report discrimination every time it occurs instead of allowing them to 
appraise the full impact of their mistreatment will lead to a greater number of 
unnecessary EEO reports and therefore an impractical policy. If federal courts can 
appreciate the disadvantages faced by Title VII plaintiffs in bringing their claims, 
they will strive toward a more considered standard.
